We estimate a dynamic model of mortgage default for a cohort of Colombian debtors between 1997 and 2004. We use the estimated model to study the eects on default of a class of policies that aected the evolution of mortgage balances in Colombia during the 1990's. We propose a framework for estimating dynamic behavioral models accounting for the presence of unobserved state variables that are correlated across individuals and across time periods. We extend the standard literature on the structural estimation of dynamic models by incorporating an unobserved common correlated shock that aects all individuals' static payos and the dynamic continuation payos associated with dierent decisions. Given a standard parametric specication the dynamic problem, we show that the aggregate shocks are identied from the variation in the observed aggregate behavior. The shocks and their transition are separately identied, provided there is enough cross-sectional variation of the observed states.
Introduction
In this paper we specify a dynamic model of mortgage default and estimate it using microlevel Colombian data spanning the years between 1998 and 2004. During this time, mortgage default rates in Colombia were unusually high due to an unprecedented economic downturn that was accompanied by a dramatic fall in home prices. The extent to which the fall in household incomes and the fall in home prices contributed separately to the unprecedented * University of Wisconsin-Madison rates of default is a relevant policy question that can be answered within the model we
propose. In addition, we use the model to evaluate the impact of counterfactual policies which cannot be evaluated with a model that doesn't account for the dynamic concerns of debtors. We show that in the context of our data, the expectations of individuals regarding the evolution of relevant variables had a substantial impact on default behavior.
The estimation of discrete choice dynamic models is limited by the ability of standard microeconometric techniques to incorporate a rich pattern of unobserved heterogeneity aecting the choices of individuals. In the context of our data, accounting for common unobserved shocks is crucial for understanding the relationship between the observed states and the observed default behavior. The standard techniques for estimating such behavioral models are based on the assumption that all the unobserved heterogeneity is independent across individuals 1 . In this paper we develop a framework for estimating dynamic structural models under the presence of unobserved states that are both correlated across individuals and over time, due to the presence of unobserved common states.
The literature on the estimation of structural models that allow for correlated common shocks is scarce. For example, in the approach proposed by Altug and Miller (1998) the structure of the aggregate shocks is estimated separately and used as input into the dynamic model, which is then estimated using the technique developed by Hotz and Miller (1993) .
Such approach is only practical when the aggregate shocks can be estimated from a separate model (e.g. a macroeconomic model). A closer paper to ours is Lee and Wolpin (2006) , in which the aggregate shocks are computed throughout the estimation algorithm using a general equilibrium model. In their case, the estimation is complicated by the need to solve the equilibrium throughout the estimation to obtain the aggregate shocks and their transition.
The methodological contribution of our paper is the incorporation, identication and estimation of the unobserved states that generate correlation both in the cross section and over time using a standard micro data set. In other words, we show that estimating a dynamic model with aggregate unobserved shocks doesn't require the solution of an aggregate model.
In our model, in addition to a time invariant individual specic unoberved state, there is 1 Early papers include Rust (1987) , Wolpin (1984) , Pakes (1986) and Hotz and Miller (1993) ; later papers as Keane and Wolpin (1994) incorporate unobserved states that vary systematically across individuals but stay constant over time. For a comprehensive review of the literature see, for example, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)) an unobserved correlated state that is common to all individuals and that is correlated over time. For simplicity, we refer to these unobserved correlated common states as aggregate shocks. Our specication of the dynamic model is based on a Markovian decision problem with nite horizon in which the payos depend on observed and unobserved state variables that vary systematically across individuals. As we show, in this particular formulation of the dynamic model, the micro data contains enough information to infer the aggregate shocks and their transition separately. The identication and estimation of these common correlated states exploits the variation in aggregate behavior, which is a piece of information that is not used directly by the existing literature. We show conditions under which these aggregate unobserved shocks and their transition probability are separately identied in a standard specication of a dynamic discrete choice model.
In the next section of the paper we describe our methodological framework. We formulate an optimal stopping problem with correlated unobserved heterogeneity, describe our estimation approach and discuss the identication of the dierent components of the model.
In Section 3 of the paper we present the application of the model to the Colombian mortgage market. We describe the data, the estimation and the results. We perform counterfactual simulations to evaluate the impact of the policies adopted by the Central Bank and the Colombian government in the mid-1990s. The paper concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the proposed framework.
The framework
Consider the problem of a mortgage debtor who is deciding whether to default or continue making the mortgage payments on his home. This problem can be described as a discrete choice problem in which the choice of defaulting generates a payo associated with the increased probability of foreclosure, a more restrictive access to the credit markets in the future, etc. Continuing making the mortgage payments generates a static payo associated with the continued enjoyment of the home, plus the option of making the same decision the next period (i.e. the continuation value).
Formally, denote the ow utility that the individual i obtains from enjoying the home at time t asũ(S i,t ) and the ow utility associated with the choice of default as W (S i,t ), wherẽ S i,t is the set of observed and unobserved (from the analyst's perspective) state variables that aect payos and that determine its expected evolution over time. For any t lower than the last period (T i ) of the mortgage, the problem of this individual can be described recursively as follows:
V (S i,t ) = max {continue, default} ũ(S i,t , ε i,t ) + E[βṼ (S i,t+1 )|S i,t ], W (S i,t ) ,
such that at the terminal period the continuation payo is a constantṼ (S i,T i ) = K i,t .
The specication of the optimal default problem in (1) highlights the importance of expectations in determining default decisions. The reason is that making mortgage payments is equivalent to purchasing an option to default in the future and the value of the option depends on the expected evolution of the relevant state variables. This is why debtors may choose not to default even if they have negative equity.
We are interested in inferring the relationship between the state variablesS i,t and the observed behavior from individual-level data. The estimated model can then be used to simulate and evaluate counterfactual equilibria, exogenous policies and the impact of exogenous shocks. We are interested in a dynamic structural model like the one in equation (1) because it allows the evaluation of policies and shocks that cannot be evaluated with reduced form methods. In particular, we can evaluate policies that aect the expected evolution of the states but that do not aect the current values. For example, the introduction of adjustable rate mortgages introduced a dynamic feature into mortgage contracts that by denition cannot be accounted for by reduced form models, specially when these policies have not been observed in the past.
The specics of the implementation of the model with real data are left for the application section below. For now, notice that the problem in (1) corresponds to an optimal stopping problem with an absorbing state. The main challenge associated with the identication and estimation of such models is accounting for a rich correlation over time and across individuals of the unobserved states contained inS i,t . In the context of our mortgage default application it is important that we account for the potential correlation of the unobserved aggregate shocks that aect everyone's decisions because, as documented in earlier work by Carranza and Estrada (2007) , most the variation of default over time in Colombia cannot be explained by micro-level factors.
Even if one accounts for the presence of aggregate shocks, for example by using time dummies, ignoring the potential serial correlation of the aggregate shocks might lead to estimation bias. For example, if individuals expect the unobserved benets of defaulting to increase over time, they might choose to delay default even if current payos are negative.
payos.
In the next section, we discuss identication of structural dynamic models with serially correlated unobserved shocks and present a general method for their estimation. We show that the aggregate shocks are identied in micro-level data and can be estimated using a simple variation of the standard methods. We then estimate a dynamic model of optimal default with our Colombian data set using the arguments we present below.
A generic optimal stopping problem
Consider the standard optimal stopping problem of an individual i at time t ≤ T i , who has to choose action j ∈ {0, 1} where j = 0 is an absorbing state over a nite horizon T i which may be dierent across individuals. Each choice generates a static a payoũ i,j,t ≡ u(X i,j,t ) + ε i,j,t with an observed component u(X i,j,t ) that depends on a vector of observable (to the econometrician) states X i,j,t . It also depends on an additive unobserved state variable ε i,j,t that is correlated across individuals and time periods.
At time t, the problem of the individual is to maximize the ow of payos from τ = t, ..., T i :
where d i = {d t , ...d T i } is a sequence of feasible decisions such that once d i,τ = 0 is chosen, no other alternative can be chosen.
Normalize the payo generated by the action j = 0 to zero and relabel u i,1,t ≡ u i,t . Let S i,t ≡ {X i,t , ε i,0,t , ε i,1,t } be the set of relevant state variables for individual i at time t. The vector of observed states X i,t is assumed to follow a rst order Markov process independently of the unobserved states and so it can be recovered directly from the data. The unobserved states {ε i,0,t , ε i,1,t } are also assumed to be Markovian as described below.
We can use the Bellman representation to write recursively the problem for individual i who, as of time t − 1 < T − 1, has not chosen j = 0 as:
where β is a known exogenous discount rate. At t = T i the continuation payo of the problem is zero, so that:
It has been shown before that the model above is generically not identied non-parametrically 2 .
Therefore, the mapping of the model above into data is based partly on parametric assumptions on the distribution of the unobserved states ε. In order to allow for a rich pattern of unobserved correlation, we decompose the unobserved states as follows:
where i,t is an iid idiosyncratic disturbance, which we assume is distributed logit, a standard and convenient assumption. The term µ i is an individual-specic unobservable state that stays constant over time and is distributed among the population of individuals according to a distribution Φ(µ i ). The term ξ t is a common aggregate unobserved shock that follows a rst order Markov process. The individual heterogeneity distribution Φ () and the distribution (i.e. the transition of ) ξ have to be estimated simultaneously with the whole model.
Notice that, under this specication, individual choices are correlated over time and across debtors even after conditioning on the observed states; in addition, this unobserved heterogeneity can be allowed to depend on X i,t which would be equivalent to a model with heterogenous coecients. The model is similar to the standard dynamic discrete choice models except for the presence of the shock ξ t = 0 which is allowed to be correlated over time. The importance of including this form of heterogeneity is that it permits individual choices to be correlated (in unobservable ways) in a given cross section (since all individuals face the same shock) and for this correlation to persist over time. We will refer to these shocks as aggregate shocks, but they more generally can be understood as the common component of the unobserved heterogeneity.
The model we specify nests the standard models in the literature. Specically, if we set µ i = ξ t = 0, all the unobserved heterogeneity in the model is iid and the model is similar to the models in Rust (1987) , Wolpin (1987) , Hotz and Miller (1993) and Pakes (1986) . If we assume away the aggregate shocks so that ξ t = 0, but account for a correlated individual shock µ i = 0 the model is similar to Keane and Wolpin (1994) .
In contrast to the models by Altug and Miller (1998) and Lee and Wolpin (2006) we don't need to specify where the aggregate shocks stem from. In Section 2.3 we show that micro data alone is enough to identify the aggregate shocks and their transition separately. In a general equilibrium setup, the specication of a model for the determination of the aggregate shocks 2 Rust (1994) ; see also Taber (2000) and Heckman and Navarro (2007) for conditions under which these models are semiparametrically identied ξ and their transition would be necessary for the computation of counterfactual equilibria, but not for the estimation of the model. Let S i,t ≡ {X i,t , µ i , ξ t } be the the set of state variables, excluding the idiosyncratic iid error. Dene the expected value function as the expectation of the value function in (3) with respect to the idiosyncratic iid shock, conditional on the current states:
where the second equality is the standard social surplus" equation which follows from the logit assumption.
For convenience, write the expectation of (6) as a function of the conditioning states as follows:
where the expectation is taken with respect to the dynamic states given their realization and their transition probabilities. For given state variables and transition probabilities, this value can be computed using standard numerical techniques starting at the terminal period.
Conditional on survival, the predicted probability that individual i chooses j = 1 at time t is given by:
where the continuation payos correspond to the expectation of (7). Notice that this probability depends on both the realization of the unobserved individual heterogeneity µ i and the aggregate shock ξ t .
Next, we dene the probability of any given sequence of choices which we will use below.
Given (8), letP r i denote the probability of an individual history which can be computed as the product of probabilities over the given sequence of choices, conditional on the realization of the individual heterogeneity and the aggregate shocks:
whereT i is the last time period at which the loan is observed to be outstanding either because it is defaulted on or because it reaches its maturity, i.e. either the time when individual i rst chooses j = 0 or the nal period T i if it always chooses j = 1.
Estimation
Consider estimating the model above using a random sample of i = 1, ..., N individuals who are observed solving the described optimal stopping problem during a sequence of 
Given the observed states, their transition probabilities can be estimated directly from the data before estimating the whole model if they are exogenous. The remaining parameters, the transition of the aggregate shocks and the shocks themselves ξ = {ξ 1 , ..., ξT } have to be estimated jointly. The sample likelihood is given by: w
where the choice probabilities are integrated with respect to the initial distribution of µ, Φ. case, maximizing (10) can be dicult, specially if the number of periodsT is large, because each shock ξ t has to be estimated for all t.
We show now how the estimation of these aggregate shocks can be concentrated out from the wider estimation algorithm by using aggregate information not commonly used in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models. In other words, we show that the estimation of the model is identical to the estimation of a standard model with the addition of a restriction that arises from the likelihood itself that identies the aggregate shocks. Specically, take the derivative of (10) with respect to each ξ t and set it equal to zero to obtain the following condition:
where N d i,t is the number of individuals in the sample who choose action j = 1 at time t.
The rst term on the right hand side of (11) is the expected aggregate choice probability conditional on the observed individual histories. The second term is the sample covariance of the prediction error and the derivative of the expected continuation payo with respect to the aggregate shock, again conditional on the observed histories. Notice that this condition is not the often used restriction matching the predicted and the observed aggregate choice probabilites exactly. This implies that an ecient estimation of the model won't perfectly match the predicted and the observed aggregate choice probabilities.
Equation (11) generates a set ofT non-linear equations, which can be used to concentrate out the estimation of ξ from the problem of estimating θ. In other words, for any set of parameters θ 0 , we can solve for the parameters ξ 0 that satisfy (11) as we look numerically for the estimator θ * and its associated ξ * .
Notice that, in general, (11) reduces to a set of intuitive average probabilities. Since the predicted choice probability and the expected continuation payos are conditioned on the same set S i,t of state variables, the covariance of the second term should converge to zero since this covariance is zero in the population. It follows then that, when N t is large, the expression above can be approximated by the following expression:
which might be an easier expression to use when concentrating out the estimation of ξ.
If we compute (11) in the population, we obtain a condition that we state as Lemma 1.
This lemma can also be used to concentrate out the estimation of ξ when the population shares are observed and the second term on the RHS of equation (11) is zero. Denote the empirical distribution of the observed states as F t (x), which is (by assumption) independent of the distribution Φ of unobserved states. Let also s 1,t be the share of choice j = 1 at each time t among active agents.
Lemma 1 Consider the estimation of the model described by the choice probabilities (8) and (9). At the true value of θ and ξ the following condition holds:
This lemma states that, at the true value of the parameters, the observed aggregate choice probability has to be equal to a weighted average of the predicted choice probabilities. The weighting is equivalent to conditioning the predicted choice probabilities on the observed choice history of each individual up until the terminal periodT i .
As a corollary of this lemma, we point out below that if there is no persistent unobserved heterogeneity the condition (13) reduces to a simple average. This condition is similar to the standard BLP-style market-level condition that is used to concentrate out the estimation of choice-specic shocks from the estimation of discrete demand systems, except that it only holds when the second term on the RHS of equation (11) is zero. The proof follows trivially from Lemma 1, by noting that when there is no persistent unobserved heterogeneity, the integrals in the expressions above vanish.
Corollary 1 Consider the estimation of the model described by the choice probabilities (8) and (9). Let µ i = µ ∀i so that the distribution Φ is degenerate. At the true value of θ and ξ the following condition holds:
An interesting feature of (11) and (12) is that the average choice probabilities at any period t are not conditioned on the survival until t − 1 but on the whole history untilT i .
This property is not a consequence of the dynamic structure of the problem, but of the presence of unobserved correlated shocks. In fact, this condition extends to static models (as in ?) in the sense that, whenever there are unobserved correlated shocks, ecient estimation with a nite sample would require that the observed aggregate choice behavior matches the predicted behavior, conditional on the observed choices. That is, when concentrating out the aggregate shocks under the presence of individual unobserved heterogenity, one should not exactly match the observed aggregate choice behavior to the simple predicted choice probability but rather to a weighted version of these probabilities.
When the population shares s 1,t are known exactly, so that the data set is a combination of micro-level and market-level information, Lemma 1 can be used to concentrate out" the estimation of the aggregate shocks ξ from the estimation algorithm using the aggregate choice probabilities. Specically, at each time t and for given parameters θ 0 and ξ 0 , the model generates a vector of aggregate predicted choice probabilitys 1,t (θ 0 , ξ 0 ). If the model is correctly specied and the sample is large (13) must hold:
Given any value of θ 0 , the expression in (15) generates a system ofT non-linear equations, so that a unique value of ξ(θ 0 ) can be solved for directly. If the population shares s 1,t are not observed, but only the sharess 1,t in the sample, then (11) or (12) can be used instead.
The feasible computation of the model requires that for any set of feasible parameters θ 0 , the vector ξ 0 that solves (11) be always dened. Moreover, the identication of the model will require that the vector ξ 0 be unique, at least around the true vector ξ * . The following lemma establishes sucient conditions under which the solution to (15) exists and is unique.
The proof of this lemma, shown in the appendix, relies on the monotonicity of the average predicted default rates (13) on the aggregate shock.
Lemma 2 Let
is strictly monotone and −1 < h (ξ t ) < 1. Then, for the system of T equations implied bys 1,t = s 1,t (θ 0 , ξ) for t = 1, ..., T has a unique solution ξ(θ 0 ), if the sample size N is large (so the second term on the RHS of equation (11) is zero).
The sucient conditions for the lemma to be true are very weak in the sense that they are far from necessary. Moreover, they imply restrictions that are usually natural in empirical environments. For example, if the aggregate shocks follow a linear autoregressive process, a sucient condition for the lemma and the corollary to hold is that the process be stationary. Lemmas 1 and 2 will be used to show our identication result below. For practical purposes, they imply that the model can be estimated using standard techniques. One can do estimation with the addition of (15) as a separate restriction, thereby reducing the computational dimension of the estimation algorithm if required. In other words, it is not strictly necessary to maximize the likelihood over all the parameters of the model, which is useful specially when the number of periods is large. Specically, the model can be estimated maximizing the likelihood (10) over the parameters θ, solving numerically for ξ from (15) along the estimation algorithm:
Before presenting an application of our methodology, in the following sections we discuss the identication of the components of the model and the applicability of the methodological framework to more general environments.
Identication of the model
We discuss now the identication of the model described above and show the conditions under which such identication is possible. The main problem lies in the separate identication of the aggregate shocks and their transition, which we show is possible only when micro level information is available. Importantly, the identication conditions that allow us to separate the transition from the value of the aggregate shocks are sucient and necessary.
The choice probabilities in (8) are similar to the choice probabilities in standard empirical dynamic models with unobserved heterogeneity, except for the presence of the aggregate shocks ξ and their transition probabilities. Therefore, the identication of the utility function and the of the distribution of µ is based on similar arguments as in the standard literature.
We provide a brief discussion of their identication and then discuss in detail the identication of the aggregate shocks ξ and their transition probabilities.
As pointed out by Taber (2000) and Heckman and Navarro (2007) , the nite horizon of the problem facilitates the nonparametric identication of the dynamic discrete choice models.
We briey describe how their argument works. Notice that since at T i the continuation payos of the problem are zero, the probability that individual i chooses j = 1 , obtained from (8), doesn't contain a continuation value and therefore does not include the transition of the aggregate shocks:
Notice that in this terminal period ξ T i is simply the constant in the model. In limit sets where one can control for the dynamic selection (survival up to T i ) one can use standard arguments, i.e., Matzkin (1992) , to identify nonparametrically the utility function u (), the constant ξ T i and the nonparametric distribution of (µ i + i,T i ). Once this distribution has been identied at dierent periods (since T i represents dierent periods for dierent individuals) one can use deconvolution arguments (Kotlarski (1967) ) to recover the distribution of µ i from the repeated observations of the marginal distribtuion of (µ i + i,T i ) over time.
The novel part of this paper is the separate identication of the aggregate shocks and their transition. Intuitively, the identication of the aggregate shocks comes from the variation in the data on the aggregate behavior, a feature which is not fully exploited in the standard literature. Notice that, in practice, our estimation approach is equivalent to a standard estimation of a Markovian decision model, with the addition of the aggregate restriction (15), which directly identies the aggregate shocks.
The separate identication of the levels ξ of the aggregate shocks and their transition probabilities has to be explained in detail. >From inspecting (8) it can be seen that both the aggregate shocks ξ and their transition probabilities enter the continuation payos. Moreover, ξ enters additively the instant payos, so that it can potentially happen that changes in ξ that are oset by changes in their expected serial correlation generate identical predictions, so that they would not be separately identied.
We have two sources for the separate identication of the two set of unobservables. On one hand, notice from (17) that as we go over groups if individuals with dierent terminal periods {T 1 , ..., T N } the transition probabilities for the aggregate shocks don't enter the choice probabilities and therefore the aggregate shocks are identied up to the constant of the utility function. Therefore, if we observe individuals who face their terminal period at each time period of our sample, ξ will be identied. Since we can identify ξ for dierent periods we can, in principle, recover their transition probabilities, f (ξ t |ξ t−1 ) nonparameterically in the domain of the recovered ξ.
The second, and more general source of identication, comes from of the choice probabilities themselves. ξ and ρ ξ (the parameters of the transition probabilities) will be separately identied even in a sample of individuals who all face the same terminal period. To see this, notice that at the true value ρ * ξ of the transition parameters, our estimation algorithm looks for the unique vector ξ * that satises (15) which we can rewrite as follows:
where s 1,t is the observed proportion of individuals who choose j = 1 at time t and wherẽ P r i,t is the choice probability integrated over the distribution of individual heterogeneity, conditional on each choice history:
The key thing to notice is that, as we change ρ ξ , the algorithm will nd new vectors of ξ consistent with (18). The implicit function theorem implies that the variation of ξ as ρ ξ changes is given by:
If such variation in ξ leads to the same choice probabilities as in (19), then the two sets of parameters are not separately identied. Notice, though, that at any given ρ ξ and for every agent i, the implicit variation of ξ as ρ ξ changes such thatP r i,1,t is constant is given by:
which is in general dierent than (19), as long as the predicted choice probabilities vary across individuals. Consequently if this is the case, the predicted choice probabilities will change as the transition parameters change.
In other words, if there is variation in the observed states across individuals, the derivative of the individual choice probabilities with respect to the ρ ξ is dierent from zero. Therefore, the sample likelihood will necessarily fall around the estimated parameter ρ * ξ so that ξ and ρ ξ are separately identied as formally established in the following proposition, which we prove in the appendix. Put it dierently, if there is no individual variation on the predicted choice probabilities then equations (19) and (20) The proposition establishes the identication of ρ ξ , conditional on the utility function and the distribution of individual unobserved heterogenity, whose identication was explained before. Moreover, the identication of ρ ξ is formally independent from the identication of ξ.
That is, if we were to estimate ρ ξ using the estimated ξ (for example, by taking the estimated ξ and running a regression of ξ t against ξ t−1 ) we might nd substantial discrepancies with the estimated ρ ξ obtained from the estimation above, specially in short samples.
This implies that additional restrictions can be added to (16) to guarantee the consistency of both (the transition implied by the estimated ξ and the one estiamted from the choice probabilities), which might be desirable in long panels. More importantly, however, it also implies that the choice probabilities contain enough information to distinguish the individuals perceptions about how the aggregate shocks transitions from the actual transition implied by the realized ξ.
The identication of the parametric model is not surprising. The more important result is the nonidentication of the model when no micro level data (i.e., with no individual variation in the choice probabilities) is available. There is a growing literature on the estimation of structural dynamic models of demand using market-level data (e.g. Carranza (2007) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2006) ). Our result highlights the limits of the identication for this general class of models.
Further remarks on the methodology
For illustrative purposes, we have described our methodological framework using a simple binomial optimal stopping problem. The general approach extends naturally to more general dynamic Markov decision problems with multiple repeated choices.
For example, if instead of an absorbing state, we let individuals choose j = 0 repeatedly, the only dierence is that a continuation payo has to be computed for both j = 0 and j = 1.
This adds to the computational burden of the algorithm, but the fact that we would observe the same individuals making the same choices repeatedly over time would also strengthen the identication of the individual-level unobserved heterogeneity.
In addition, we can allow for multiple choices each with its associated continuation payo. The computation of multiple continuation payos along the estimation algorithm is feasible but computationally costly. In addition, the data requirements are stronger, as the identication of the aggregate shocks relies on the computation of choice-specic aggregate probabilities. Otherwise, the estimation approach is the same.
We should point out again that our model is a partial equilibrium model. Therefore, the aggregate shocks and their transition are taken as given and are identied from the microdata, no matter where they come from. Nevertheless, if, depending on the case, it is believed that the aggregate shocks are the result of a general equilibrium model, the specication of a macroeconomic model tying together the determination of the aggregate shocks and the observed states might be necessary to compute counterfactual equilibria as in Lee and Wolpin (2006) .
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An application to the Colombian mortgage market between 1998 and 2004
Description of the data
We use the empirical model we study in the previous section to estimate a dynamic model of optimal default using two separate data sets with information on the behavior of Colombian Since this main data set contains no information on the income of debtors over the span of the sample, survey data from the secondary data set was used to control for the changing distribution of income. This data set is part of an annual survey conducted by DANE that contains demographic information of large samples of individual household. We selected households in the sample who reported having a home loan. We use the reported income and matching housing payments to simulate the joint distribution of income and the other state variables.
In the data it is observed that some debtors stop making their payments, sometimes only temporarily and sometimes denitively. Therefore, the meaning 'default' means and its timing has to be dened. Specically, in the estimation below, loans that accumulate past due payments of more than 3 months are assumed to be defaulted and are dropped o from the data set. Default is thus dened as the event in which the number of past due payments in a loan history changes from 3 or less to more than 3 between two quarters. After a loan is dened to be defaulted, it is dropped from the sample 6 . Table 1 which is the total number of loans in the cohort. Notice from column (3) that the number of non-defaulted loans decreases gradually over time which is a reection of the high number of defaults observed in the sample. The default rate, dened as the number of defaults over the total number of outstanding loans in column (4), reaches a level higher than 7% during the fourth quarter of 1999, which is indicative of the severity of the market collapse. By the 6 The default rate based on this denition is highly correlated with default rates based on longer default periods. The 3-month threshold was chosen in order to observe as much default as possible and in order to capture all defaulted loans, including those that are terminated soon after default.
7 Since default is inferred from the change in the number of past due mortgage payments, no default is reported during the rst period of the sample.
end of the sample more than half of the loans in the sample were defaulted.
To give a sense of the characteristics of the defaulted loans we computed the average price of homes with outstanding loans (column (5)) and the average price of all homes in the sample (column (6)). Notice that up until the middle of 1999, the average price of homes with outstanding mortgages was higher than the average price of the homes of all the loans in the sample which implied that defaults tended to occur among the mortgages of the least expensive homes. After 1999 the price of homes with outstanding loans was lower than the average price of all homes in the sample, which implied that it was among mortgages of the more expensive homes where defaults were concentrated.
Besides the rich modelling of the structural error in our model, we use the secondary data set to account for the unobserved variation in individual incomes. The data correspond to the quarterly household survey collected by the Colombian national statistics agency (DANE). The survey collects demographic and economic information of a random sample of households. All households are asked their household income. In addition, once a year they are asked whether they have a mortgage or not and the corresponding monthly payments.
In order to control for the unobserved variation in income we use the distribution of income that we observe in this data set, conditional on whether the household has a mortgage or not and on their monthly payments. Specically, for each household we simulate several income draws from the data to integrate out this part of the unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. the unobserved income). The draws are taken from the corresponding quintile of the distribution of income ordered according to the monthly mortgage payments which is assumed to match the distribution of income conditional on the ratio of balance to remaining term.
To understand the roots of the extraordinarily high observed default rates in Colombia in these years, we describe the history and some institutional details of the Colombian mortgage nancing system. The centerpiece of the system, established in the 1970's, were the mortgage banks whose only purpose was to fund construction projects. In order to guarantee enough funding, these banks were the only institutions allowed to issue interest-bearing savings accounts 8 .
In addition, mortgage loans were denominated in a constant value unit called UPAC" 9 , whose value changed over time according to a rate (called the monetary correction") de-8 Regular commercial banks had exclusive rights to issue checking accounts bearing no interest.
9 UPAC stands for Unidad de Poder Adquisitivo Constante: Constant Purchasing Power Unit termined by the Central Bank which was supposed to reect the ination rate. The UPAC protected institutions and debtors against inationary risks and facilitated the long-runnancing of housing projects, which in turn gave a boost to the economy during the following decades.
Each month, debtors had to pay a proportion of the outstanding balance of their debt.
In addition, each month debtors made an interest payment on the balance. This additional interest rate was xed for the lifetime of the loan and was not set on a debtor-by-debtor basis, but was rather negotiated between the mortgage bank and the developer in charge of the construction of any type of housing project, before individual homes were sold. The following month the remaining balance was updated according to the monetary correction".
Until the early 1990's the monetary correction tracked the ination rate closely. This changed when the government decided to liberalize the nancial sector and allowed commercial banks to oer savings accounts, which until then could only be oered by the mortgage banks. The government also decided to tie the monetary correction" to a market interest rate, which meant that interest was added over time to the balance of the debts.
During these years the Colombian exchange rate was xed and the interest rate was low.
Then in the 1990's the region (indeed almost all emerging economies) experience a capital outow. The Combian Central Bank decided to defend the exchange rate at any cost, as did most countries in the area, which meant letting the interest rates increase to unprecedented levels which had a considerable negative impact on the housing industry. In addition, as home prices and household incomes started to fall, mortgage balances, that were now tied to the interest rate, ballooned. By the end of the decade, and due to the default rates observed in the data, mortgage nancing in Colombia came to a halt and was only reestablished several years later under a dierent regulatory framework.
One of the key policy questions raised by the 1990's housing crisis is to what extent to which the observed default rates were caused by the government policies and to what extent was it caused by the fall in income. Our models allows us to measure the eect of changes on each variable on the default probabilities. Moreover, it permits the simulation of the eect of counterfactual policies.
The empirical model of default
We study the behavior of mortgage holders (debtors") who live in the mortgaged piece of real estate (home"). Let the utility that a debtor i gets from the home each period t be given by the following function:
where q i,t is a measure of subjective home quality, y i,t − m i,t is the dierence between household income and mortgage payments and ε u i,t is an additive unobserved state variable, which incorporates unobserved (to the econometrician) variables that may aect default, e.g. home attributes that are only valued by its owner and other preference shocks that vary across consumers and time.
Since no home attributes are observed in our dataset, we further assume that the unobserved quality" of homes q i,t is random:
where ε q i,t is a random variable that is potentially correlated over time and across debtors.
Any systematic dierences in the subjective home quality across debtors will be captured by the correlation structure of the error which we describe in detail in Section 3.3 below.
In our data set we have no information on the required payments m i,t of each debtor.
However, it is known that the required payments are a function of mortgage balances b i,t and remaining term L i,t , with some random variation across debtors due to dierences in the xed interest rates across mortgages:
where ε m i,t is an unobserved random term that captures the unobserved variation across debtors of the required monthly payments.
We assume that default leads to an absorbing state. Let W i,t denote the value for individual i of defaulting on her mortgage at time t. This value is the result of a complex scenario. Specically, the individual may be waiting to see whether the following period she can pay back her dues; she may try to sell the home and cash the dierence between price and loan balance; she may let the bank take over the property to cover her obligation; nally, she could also just stop making payments indenitely and face forfeiture or a renegotiation with the bank.
The resulting value of default W i,t is the weighted sum of payos across the random scenarios just described. We assume that W i,t has the following linear reduced form:
whereπ i,t is the expected price of the home at time t, b i,t is the balance of the debt, y i,t is the debtor's income and ε w i,t are other unobserved (to the econometrician) attributes. These are variables that enter directly the payos of the individual scenarios arising after a default decision as discussed above.
Group the unobserved components into one error termε i,t ≡ γε
,ε i,t } be the vector of observed and unobserved states and assume they follow a rst order Markov process. We can obtain the value of the debtor's problem at each point in time as function of variables that can be mapped to the data and of unobserved random variables:
where it is assumed that at the last period of the mortgage T i the continuation payo of non-default is zero:
The parameters to be estimated ζ = {ζ 0 , ζ 1 , ζ 2 , ζ 3 , ζ 4 } are linear combinations of the underlying structural parameters. Notice that this function can be computed recursively starting from the last period if all the state variables and their transitions are known.
Estimation
In order to estimate the model we decompose the unobserved stateε i,t as follows:
where µ i is an individual-specic unobservable state and i,t is an iid idiosyncratic disturbance which we assume follows a logit distribution. The term ξ t is a common aggregate unobserved shock with a transition indexed by the vector ρ ξ = {ρ 
where ω ξ t is an error with a distribution described by parameters ρ ξ 2 .
We estimate the model above using debtor-level data on mortgage balances, mortgage terms and home prices over a set of t = 1, ...T time periods. Since the Colombian mortgage data we use does not contain matching income data tracing the evolution of income for individual debtors, we use household survey data containing information on debtors' income and mortgage payments as described in the data section. We treat income y i,t as an unobserved state with distribution given by G y t (y|b/L), which is the empirical distribution of income conditional on the mortgage payments we observe in the secondary survey data.
We also assume that µ is correlated with the initial loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of each loan, which is regarded as a good predictor of the risk attitude of debtors in the literature.
We assume that this underlying correlation is determined by the following loading equation:
where ν i ∼ N (0, α 2 2 ), and µ is distributed according to the mixture of three normal distributions with parameters σ = {μ, σ 2 µ , w µ } such thatμ, σ 2 µ and w µ are 3 × 1 vectors containing the means, the variances and the probabilities of each distribution, respectively. We normalize the mean of the mixture to zero. We denote this distribution as Φ(µ; σ). The vector σ of parameters of the mixture distribution and the coecients of (29) above are estimated jointly with the other parameters of the model. Let X t ≡ {X 1,t , ..., X Nt,t } where X i,t = (π i,t , b i,t , L i,t ) contains the observed states. We estimate the transition X i,t directly from the data according to: The transition of the balance is assumed to depend on both the balance and the remaining term of the mortgage. It is estimated using only non-defaulted mortgages so that it reects the expected evolution of the balance for household that have not defaulted yet. Since house prices are updated using a price index, the transition is basically the same for everyone.
The transition of income is common for households within the same quintile of the income distribution. We assume that the errors of the transitions (30) are independent of the error ε i,t , so that they can be estimated separately.
Under the given assumptions, the model above generates the following non-default probability for debtor i at time t conditional on not having defaulted on the mortgage up to t − 1 and conditional on the realization of the random states:
1 + e ζ 0 +ζ 1πi,t +ζ 2 y i,t +ζ 3 b i,t +ζ 4 L i,t +ξt+µ i +βΨ t+1 .
where Ψ t = E Ṽ t is the expected value function as dened in (6) and (7) which is computed using the specied transition probabilities.
For any realization of the aggregate shocks and any choice of parameters θ
we can obtain the aggregate non-default probability for each time period as dened in (13):
where Φ is the distribution of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. In principle one can use (11) and solve for the implied vector of aggregate shocks ξ(θ 0 ). 
where the likelihood accounts also for the the distribution of the errors ω of the LT V loading equation. Estimates of θ are obtained by nding the vector that maximizes (33).
Computation and results.
For any value of θ along the estimation algorithm, the computation of (33) requires the use of numerical techniques to integrate out the distribution of income and µ. We proceed as follows: For each mortgage i at time t, a set of S i income draws {Y st } s=1,...S i is simulated from the corresponding quintile of the empirical distribution of income conditional on the monthly mortgage payments, contained in the secondary" data set. In addition, for each income draw and for any vector σ of mixture parameters, the distribution of µ is used to integrate them out using a quadrature method.
The computation of the likelihood of individual default/non-default observations requires in addition the computation of the expected value functions (6), which is done recursively starting from the last period for each mortgage term length. There are four types of term length in the data: 5 years, 10 years, 15 years and 20 years. For each term length and given the transition of the observed states and the assumed transition of the aggregate shocks, the expected value functions are computed backwards using a multilinear interpolant in order to preserve monotonicity of the valu function with respect to ξ t .
The algorithm we describe concentrates the agrgegate shocks ξ out since, for many applications, this will be the only feasible way of estimating the model. However, in our application the number of observed time periods is not that long (30) so we in fact maximize the likelihood function (33) with respect to all parameters including the aggregate shocks ξ. We then check that at the estimated values the predicted default probabilities match the observed shares as in (15).
In total, we estimate eight versions of the model: four duration 10 models with myopic debtors and four fully dynamic models. Each type of model was estimated with and without persistent unobserved heterogeneity and with and without income heterogeneity. The quarterly discount rate was set to β = 0.97.
We show on table 2 the estimated parameters of the duration models, which are equivalent to the model described above, except that we set the discount rate equal to zero β = 0. In these models, the aggregate shocks correspod simply to time-changing constants. Model I contains no dynamics, no persistent unobserved heterogeneity and no income heterogeneity.
Model II adds only income heterogeneity to model I, whereas model III adds persistent unobserved heterogeneity to model I. Model IV is a duration model with both persistent unobserved heterogeneity and heterogeneous income.
On table 3 we display the estimated parameters of the fully dynamic models. Model V contains no persistent unobserved heterogeneity and no income heterogeneity. Model VI is a dynamic model with income heterogeneity, whereas model VII has persistent unobserved heterogeneity but no income. Model VIII has full dynamics, persistent unobserved hetero-10 We call these models duration models since, as shown in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007) , they can be interpreted as generalization of the often used mixed proportional hazards and generalized accelerated failure time models of the duration literature.
geneity and heterogeneous income.
For each model, we show the estimated coecients and the estimated marginal eects integrated over the distribution of debtors, with their corresponding standard errors. The marginal eects are computed with respect to a 10% change in each of price, balance and income and a one quarter change in term length. In the case of the dynamic models (table 3) , the marginal eects are computed accounting for the eects of changes in the state variables on the continuation payos.
We discuss rst the results of the estimation of the duration models displayed in table 2, where the dependent variable is the probability of not making default, as indicated above.
The results imply that, conditional on all other variables, home price has a negative eect on default probability, while the value of the mortgage balance and the remaining number of quarters left in the mortgage have a positive eect on the default probability as expected.
The rst salient feature of the estimates of the duration models is the eect of accounting for the persistent unobserved heterogeneity on the estimated price and balance coecients.
Comparing the estimates in models I and II with the results of models III and IV, we can see that the price and balance coecients are in absolute value much bigger in the models that include the persistent unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated marginal eects, which are precisely estimated, are literally doubled. These eects imply that a 10% increase in balance or in home price changes, on average, the quarterly default probability by one percentage point, an economically very signicant gure.
The second salient feature of the results is the economic irrelevance of income on the default rates. Statistically, models I and II seem to indicate that income is positively correlated with default. After controlling for the persistent heterogeneity such correlation becomes insignicant. In either case, the magnitude of the estimated eects is very small.
We also report on the lower part of the table the estimated coecients of the loading equation that correlates the persistent unobserved heterogeneity with the initial loan-tovalue LTV of the loans. The estimates suggest that higher initial LTV is associated with a higher taste" for default, which simply means that riskier debtors select themselves into more leveraged mortgages. The estimates, however, are statistically insignicant. We also report the variance of the persistent heterogeneity which is computed over the mixture of estimated normal distributions and its respective probabilities (not shown).
The estimates corresponding to the fully dynamic models are presented in table 3. The upper part of the table contains the estimates of the dynamic models without persistent unobserved heterogeneity (models V and VI), while the lower part contains the estimates of the models with persistent heterogeneity (models VII and VIII). The rst thing to notice is that the inclusion of persistent unobserved heterogeneity has a signicant eect on the price and balance coecients as was the case with the duration models. In models VII and VIII the estimated marginal eects of changing price or balance by 10% are higher in absolute value than in the duration models, even though the dierence is not statistically signicant.
A key dierence between the models in tables 2 and 3 is that in the dynamic model a change in a variable has two eects. I has an eect on the current default probability through its eect on the current payos via the parameter γ same as in the duration models.
In addition, it also has an eect through the expected evolution of the changed variable in the future which aects the continuation payos associated with any choice. The marginal eects reported for the dynamic model account for these two eects.
As a consequence, we can calculate the eects of a purely transitory shock to the state variables that does not aect its transition which will be, in general, smaller in magnitude than the reported marginal eects. While, in general, we cannot compare coecients across specications they are more or less comparable across specications that have no persistent unobserved heterogeneity. To see this, denote the estimated marginal eect asme and let ce be the estimated coecient of interest. Abusing notation, the estimated marginal eect is approximately given then by:m e =ˆĉeP r 2 i dF i whereP r i is the predicted choice probability of debtor i and F i is the distribution of observed and unobserved debtor characteristics. In the models without unobserved persistent heterogeneity (models I, II, V and VI) the distribution F i is the same across specications.
Since at the estimated parameters and for all specications´ĉeP r i dF i ≈ s, where s is the observed default probability, then we know that the estimated coecients have more or less a similar scaling and are therefore roughly comparable.
If we compare the estimated coecients in the duration models I and II in table 2 with the estimated coecients from the dynamic models V and VI in table 3 (i.e. models with no unobserved heterogeneity), we can see that the estimated coecients are much larger (in absolute value) in the duration models than in the dynamic models. The reason for this dierence is that the coecients of the duration models are trying to capture the entire eect of the variables, whereas in the dynamic models, the coecient captures only the static eect.
This highlights the fact that the dynamic models make it possible to distinguish between transitory shocks and shocks that spill over time periods.
The estimates in table 3 of the aggregate transition parameters ρ ξ are not very precise.
The displayed results correspond to an estimation of the model in which no restriction was imposed to force the estimates of ρ ξ to be consistent with the estimates of ξ. As we pointed out before, because in our model both sets of parameters are separately identied we can actually recover the implicit beliefs of debtors about the evolution of ξ separately from the actual transition implied by their realization.
We nd that the persistence coecient ρ ξ 1 of the autoregressive process that drives the expected evolution of ξ is negative. If we estimated the coecient directly on the estimated ξ, such persistence coecient would be positive. This dierence implies that debtors were too pessimistic about the evolution of the aggregate shocks and were therefore anticipating their default decisions. The lack of statistical signicance, however, does not allow us to draw any strong conclusion.
We do not include measures of the t of the model in the tables of results because the t of all models at the market level is virtually perfect. We have already shown that the unrestricted maximization of the model likelihood implies that at the estimated parameters (15) holds. In other words for every set of estimated parameters and for every specication of the model, the observed default rate is virtually equal to the average default rate across surviving debtors, weighted by the corresponding history probability.
We nish our discussion of the results with a counterfactual policy simulation that illustrates the usefulness of the model. As we indicated when describing the data, the observed default rates were driven both by an economic slowdown and an exogenous policy decision that drove up the mortgage balances. We now compute the counterfactual default behavior of debtors under a natural policy alternative. Specically, we will assume that the monetary correction" rate which was set by the Central Bank was tied to the ination rate instead of the market interest rate.
Under the counterfactual policy assumption, each debtor pays a proportion of its real balance each period depending on the number of periods left in the mortgage. Therefore the evolution of real balances can be perfectly anticipated by debtors. That is, under the counterfactual assumption, the transition of real balances is given by:
This transition approximates the initial spirit of the UPAC system as an institutional arrangement to protect banks and debtors against inationary risks. Notice that this new transition does not contain an error term, so that we are doing more than just changing the policy: we are also eliminating all uncertainty regarding the evolution of balances.
We perform our counterfactual analysis using the estimates of model VIII. Given that our sample size falls rapidly over time as debtors default on their loans we compute rst a baseline simulation with the given transitions. We take all debtors in our sample and have them start their mortgages simultaneously on the rst quarter of 1997. For each debtor we draw ten simulated histories of observed states and unobserved heterogeneity using the estimated distribution of states. The analog of the default rate in the simulation is the hazard rate, which we can average across simulated debtors as we follow their survival and default probability over time. We obtain the counterfactual default rates performing the same computation on the simulated sample using the counterfactual transition of balances (34) instead of the one we estimated from the data.
We show the results of the baseline simulation and the counterfactual computation in Figure 1 over the 30 periods in our sample. As can be seen, the counterfactual default rates are consistently lower than the baseline simulation. Moreover, since as debtors default they can not start again, these dierences accumulate over time. At the end of the sample around 70% of debtors have defaulted under the baseline simulation. Under the counterfactual simulation around 50% of debtors default. In other words, the policy of tying the balances to a market interest rate was the cause of at least 2/7 of the observed defaults.
This dierence is substantial and is only a lower bound estimate of the impact of the counterfactual policy, because we have kept all other variables at their observed levels. Specifically, we would expect that home prices were aected negatively by the observed default rates. If we allowed for general equilibrium eects, the home prices would be higher in the counterfactual simulation and the equilibrium counterfactual default rates would be even lower. In fairness, we should mention again that there is no uncertainty in the counterfactual transition of real balances, which might not be a realistic assumption, given that debtors know that the policy can be changed at any time in the future.
Notice also that the change of the policy has an eect on the default behavior of debtors through its eect on both the realization of the mortgage balances and its expected evolution over time. In fact theannouncement of the policy has an immediate eect on default, even before the states change, due to its eect on the continuation payos. To illustrate this phenomenon and evaluate its signicance, we computed the eect of announcing the policy change at any point in time. Specically, at each time t ≤T we assume that the expected evolution of the balances changes to (34). This change has no eect on the current states, but has an an immediate eect on the continuation payos. Figure 2 shows the default rates obtained in the the baseline simulation and the predicted default rates if at each of these time periods the government suddenly announced the change in the policy. The displayed counterfactual rates are signicantly lower than the baseline rates, even though the current states have not changed at all. The average dierence between the two rates is almost two percent points. This highlights the fact that policies that aect the expectations of debtors can have a substantial eect on current default rates, even if they don't have any eect on the observed relevant state variables. We should point out,
nally, that a reduced form" estimation, by denition, would predict that such a policy has no eect on current default. This class of policies can only be evaluated with a structural approach like ours that accounts for the dynamic concerns of debtors.
Final remarks
The dynamic model of default described above was estimated with a methodology that accounts for a very rich structure of unobserved heterogeneity. Specically, it incorporates individual-level heterogeneity using both survey and simulated data. Our main contribution is the addition of aggregate time-varying heterogeneity, allowing for a rich pattern of unobserved heterogeneity.
The standard techniques for estimating dynamic structural models have limited applicability due to diculties associated with incorporating correlated unobserved states. In that sense, the applicability of our methodology goes beyond the estimation of default models. It can be used to estimate dynamic structural models in environments with both micro-level and aggregate data.
The proposed framework identies the aggregate heterogeneity exploiting the aggregate variation of choices over time. We showed that the aggregate shocks are separately identied from their transition, as long as there is micro-level variation in the observed states. This result is important because it highlights the limitations of identication of dynamic models when only market-level information is available.
We applied the methodology to address the factors that determined the mortgage default years of the current decade. We showed that the policy of tying the variation of mortgage balances to the interest rate, instead of the ination rate, was the cause of a substantial part (but presumably not all) of the observed defaults.
The use of dynamic structural model to study mortgage default highlights the often overlooked fact that default behavior does not only depend on the dierence between home price and mortgage balance. As we showed, default depends also on the expected evolution of these variables, which aects the option value of defaulting in the future. For example, it is possible to design policies that increase the value of not defaulting, while keeping the current states (including balance) constant. The extent to which this is possible is an empirical issue which can only be addressed with the specic data and an empirical dynamic model, like ours.
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume: (i) the aggregate shocks follow an autoregressive process such that ξ t+1 = h(ξ t ) + υ t+1 , where υ is an iid error with cdf F υ , such that E t [ξ t+1 |ξ t ] = h(ξ t );(ii) −1 < ∂h(ξt ∂ξt < 1;
(iii) the sample size N is large. We need to show that for any parameters θ 0 such that the assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) hold, equation (15) has a unique solution ξ(θ 0 ).
First, assume that θ = θ 0 and rewrite the mapping as follows:
where 0 <s 1,t < 1 and s 1,t are the observed and predicted proportions of individuals who choose j = 1 at time t, respectively. The integral is computed with respect to the distribution Φ t , conditioned on the observed history. The expected continuation payos can be computed recursively starting at T , when
We prove existence and uniqueness by showing that under the given conditions the mapping s 1,t (., ξ t ) shown above is bounded by zero and one and is strictly monotone in ξ t . The derivative of s 1,t with respect to ξ t is given by:
whereas the derivative of S 1,t with respect to ξ t for t = t is:
∂s 1,t (., ξ t ) ∂ξ t =ˆ P r i,1,t (S i,t ) (κ(S i,t ) −ˆκ(S i,t )P r íP r i dΦ P r íP
where the function κ(.) is given by:
κ(S i,t ) = (−P r i,1,t (S i,t )) 1−d i,t (1 − P r i,1,t (S i,t ))
The rst thing to notice is that the second term in (A2) and (A3) are the average of an expectation error. Therefore, as the sample size goes to innity, these terms become zero.
Therefore, all we need to do to show that in large samples the mapping (A1) is monotone is show that the rst term in (A2) is either positive or negative.
We will show now that the (A2) is always positive. Notice rst that the derivative of the continuation payos with respect to ξ t is given by: ∂E t V (S i,t+1 ) ∂ξ t =ˆ P r i,t+1 ∂h(ξ t ) ∂ξ t 1 + β ∂E t V i,1,t+2 (S i,t+2 ) ∂ξ t dF υ
for t < T . At t = T , this derivative is
Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that −1 < ∂EtV (S i,t+1 ) ∂ξt < 1. To see this, start computing (A4) at t = T − 1 and then solve backwards. This, in turn implies that (A2) is strictly positive. Therefore, s 1,t (., ξ t ) is strictly monotone (increasing) ∀ξ t .
Another implication of −1 < ∂EtV (S i,t+1 ) ∂ξt < 1 is that as ξ t → ∞, in (A1) s 1,t → 1.
Conversely, as ξ t → −∞, s 1,t → 0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1
The probability that a particular history {d i,1 , ..., d i,T i } is observed is given by (9):P r i dΦ =ˆT s 1,t =ˆP r i,1,t (.; γ, ρ ξ , ξ t (γ, ρ ξ ))P r i (.; γ, ρ ξ , ξ(γ, ρ ξ ))P r i (.; γ, ρ ξ , ξ(γ, ρ ξ ))dΦ dΦdF t (x)
The implicit function theorem implies that as ρ ξ changes, ξ changes in (A6) according to the following derivative:
dξ t dρ ξ = − ∂s 1,t /∂ρ ξ ∂s 1,t /∂ξ
Given Lemma 2, this derivative is well dened, provided that its conditions are met.
Assume (i) that the preference parameter γ is known; and (ii) that for some i, j ∈ N t it is true that X i = X j . Assumption (ii) implies that for at least two agents i, j ∈ N t , the predicted choice probabilities are dierent,´P r i,1,t dΦ =´P r j,1,t dΦ. Given (A5), (ii) also implies that for at least two agents i, j ∈ N t , (d´P r i,1,t dΦ/dξ t ) = (d´P r j,1,t dΦ/dξ t ).
A sucient condition for the identication of ρ ξ is that, for some i ∈ N t ∀t, the derivative of the predicted probabilities with respect to ρ ξ is dierent from zero:
d´P r i,1,t (.; γ, ρ ξ , ξ t (γ, ρ ξ ))dΦ dρ ξ = 0
In other words, we need to show that for at least one agent the predicted choice probability changes as ρ ξ changes. We prove that this is true by contradiction. Suppose that for all i ∈ N t , the derivative of the predicted choice probabilities with respect to ρ ξ are zero. Using the chain rule and replacing (A7), we obtain: 
But this is impossible because we have already argued that (A5), (ii) imply that for at least two agents i, j ∈ N t , (dP r i,1,t /dξ t ) = (dP r j,1,t /dξ t ). Therefore (A10) is false and the proposition is proved. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) In models I and II µ i = 0; all models include aggregate shocks (not shown) 
